



















Correction to “An Efficient Game Form for Unicast
Service Provisioning”
Ali Kakhbod and Demosthenis Teneketzis
May 2013
Abstract—A correction to the specification of the mechanism
proposed in [1] is given.
Index Terms— Budget balance, game form/mechanism, indi-
vidual rationality, Nash implementation, Unicast service provi-
sioning.
The mechanism presented in [1] has a tax function which is
not differentiable with respect to the allocations. We need a tax
function which is differentiable with respect to the allocations
so that we can have Nash implementation. We correct it as
follows.
We consider the problem formulated in [1]. We use the same
notation as in [1].
Specification of the game form/mechanism:
Message space: The message space is the same as that of the
mechanism presented in [1]. A message of user i ∈ N (N
denotes the set of users) is of the form




i , · · · , p
li|Ri|
i ),
where xi denotes the (non-negative) bandwidth user i requests
at all the links of his route, and pliki ≥ 0 denotes the price
user i is willing to pay per unit of bandwidth at link ljk of
his route Ri.
Outcome function: For any m ∈ M, the outcome function is
defined as follows:





where tli is the tax paid by user i for using link l. The form
of tli is the same as the tax function defined in [1] excluding
the term that is of the form described by relation (23) in [1].
For example, if |Gl| > 3, (Gl denotes the set of users using
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(P l−i and E l−i are the same as in [1]) and γ, γˆ, are positive
constants.
This completes the specification of the mechanism.
Based on the above specification, the proof of Lemma 2 in
[1] is updated as follows.
Proof of Lemma 2 in [1]: Let m∗ = (m∗i ,m∗−i) be a
NE of the game induced by the mechanism. Since user i does





= 0, (as in Eq. (34) of [1]). By
following the same steps as in equations (35-38) of [1], we







































































≥ 0. But this contradicts Eq. (5).





ζ∗l+ = 0. (7)































and along with (9) it implies

















because of (7), (11), (12), and (13).
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 5 follows when x∗i > 0.
Note that, when x∗i = 0, since user i does not have incentive










Now, set λ∗l = p∗l. Then (12) and (15) are consistent with
the KKT conditions (68-70) of [1].
I. PROPERTIES OF THE MECHANISM
Existence of Nash equilibria (NE): The proof of existence
of NE of the game induced by the mechanism is the same as
in [1] (see Theorem 6, page 398, and its proof in [1]; also see
the proof of Theorem 7).
Feasibility of allocations at NE: Because of the specification
of the mechanism and Eq. (7), the allocations corresponding
to all NE are in the feasible set.
Budget Balance at any feasible allocation: Budget balance
at any feasible allocation follows by Lemma 3 of [1].
Individual Rationality: Individual rationality follows by The-
orem 4 of [1].
Nash implementation: Nash implementation follows by The-
orem 5 of [1].
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